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MANSMANN,  Circuit Judge. 
 Through the exercise in "cooperative federalism" which 
is the hallmark of the implementation of the Education of the 
Handicapped Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400 et seq., now known as the 
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, local school boards 
are mandated to provide a free, appropriate public education for 
handicapped children alongside their peers who are not so 
impaired.  The Act authorizes federal assistance to states and 
localities for educational programs which confer an educational 
benefit on disabled students.  The Bernardsville School District 
receives an allocation of funds under this Act and thus incurs 
the responsibility to confer an educational benefit on learning 
disabled students enrolled in a public school within its 
jurisdiction.   
 J.H., the child who is the subject at the heart of this 
case, was denied the benefit of a free appropriate public 
education throughout his several years as an elementary school 
student within the Bernardsville School District.  Year after 
year the School District failed to design an Individualized 
Educational Program suitable to J.H.'s special needs, and failed 
to intervene responsibly in his quite apparent trend of academic 
and social deterioration.  Observing their son's educational 
predicament and dissatisfied with the school program in 
Bernardsville, J.H.'s parents unilaterally removed J.H. from the 
School District and enrolled him in a private out-of-state 
residential school, where J.H. improved significantly under a 
program responsive to his needs.  More than two years later, 
  
J.H.'s parents sought reimbursement from the Bernardsville School 
District for tuition and expenses for J.H.'s private education.  
J.H.'s parents argued that Bernardsville was by law obliged to 
provide J.H. with a free appropriate public education, that it 
failed utterly in this regard, and that they were virtually 
forced to enroll J.H. in an out of district school in order to 
ensure him an appropriate educational benefit.  The Act and the 
implementing regulations offer no guideline with regard to the 
timeliness of this claim for retroactive reimbursement. 
 We must decide whether J.H.'s parents requested due 
process for their son within an appropriate time limitation.  
Notwithstanding an acknowledgement of good cause for the 
frustration of J.H.'s parents and the reasonableness of their 
educational decision, we conclude that the request for 
reimbursement for the first two years after J.H. was removed from 
Bernardsville and enrolled in a private institution was untimely.  
We will award reimbursement only for J.H.'s third year of private 
education and for partial attorney's fees.    
 
 I. 
 J.H. entered the Bernardsville School District in 
September, 1980, after he had completed kindergarten at a 
parochial school and it had become apparent that his academic 
progress was not commensurate with the other children in his 
class.  In the Bernardsville School District, J.H. repeated 
kindergarten, at the end of which it was again apparent that 
J.H.'s academic skills were significantly deficient and that he 
  
had not progressed much during the academic year.  By November of 
academic year 1981-82, while J.H. was in the first grade, J.H.'s 
parents still observed a lack of progress in their son, and hired 
a private tutor for reading and math once a week.  In January, 
1982, a private learning consultant advised Mr. and Mrs. H. that 
J.H. required one-on-one academic assistance.  In January, 1982, 
the Bernardsville School District, also well aware of J.H.'s 
academic difficulties, referred J.H. to their Child Study Team,1 
and on April 8, 1982, classified J.H. as perceptually impaired.  
The District placed J.H. in a small resource room reading and 
math group, and mainstreamed J.H. for other subjects.  J.H. also 
attended summer school in the Bernardsville school district after 
completing the first grade.   
 J.H. remained in resource room instruction in the 
Bernardsville school through the end of the third grade, showing 
                     
1
.   The Bernardsville elementary school's referral for 
evaluation in J.H.'s case listed the following specific reasons 
for referral:   
 
 1. [J.H.] is very inattentive unless its a 
one to one situation. 
 
 2. He often fails to respond when his name 
is called. 
 
 3. We are concerned that there may be an 
articulation problem.  There are many words 
he cannot pronounce. 
 
 4. His answers to questions are often 
inappropriate. 
 




very limited progress and great difficulty keeping academic pace 
with his peers.  The Individualized Educational Program (IEP) 
reports created by the Bernardsville district for the years 1982-
83, 1983-84 and 1984-85, as well as Bernardsville's psychological 
evaluations of J.H., attest to J.H.'s lack of academic progress 
and a disturbing deterioration in his confidence, self-esteem and 
social interaction with peers.  The district court found that 
academic frustration and social isolation marked J.H.'s education 
experience in Bernardsville.   
 As early as October of 1982, J.H.'s resource room 
teacher, Mrs. Garland, recorded Mrs. H.'s "persistent anxiety" 
regarding the efficacy of the IEP.  Mr. Walter Mahler of the 
Bernardsville Child Study Team was also apprised in 1982 of an 
audiological evaluation and assessment of central auditory 
functioning performed by a private neurologist, which revealed 
that J.H. was experiencing significant difficulty with auditory 
figure-ground discrimination ability,2 auditory closure ability3 
and appeared also to suffer with auditory memory deficits.4  A. 
                     
2
.   The report, which was done through St. Clare's 
Hospital, indicates that auditory figure ground discrimination 
deficits may manifest as inability to communicate in an 
environment of background noise.  Communication difficulties may 
be circumvented if optimal listening conditions, including a 
quiet room with few distractions, are provided for learning.  A. 
2127. 
3
.   Auditory closure deficits cause difficulty in blending 
sounds and manifest as reading, spelling and articulation 
problems.  A. 2128. 
4
.   Auditory memory deficits may manifest as problems with 
following verbal instructions, reading comprehension and other 
verbal abilities.  A. 2128. 
  
2126-2128.  That report recommended optimal listening conditions 
for J.H. in order to enhance his academic development.  The 
report recommended specifically a quiet learning room with few 
distractions, preferential seating in a classroom, eliciting 
frequent feedback from J.H., certain speech and common memory 
training techniques, and counseled against a phonetics approach 
to reading.  Phonetics was nevertheless emphasized in J.H.'s IEPs 
for reading.5  Moreover, Mrs. H. testified before the 
administrative law judge that J.H.'s resource room was not 
reasonably free from background noise which could sabotage 
efforts to educate this attention deficit child.   
 In academic year 1986-87, at the end of J.H.'s sixth 
grade, his reading level, as measured by the Woodcock Johnson 
Psychoeducational Battery, had only progressed from 1.0 in the 
first grade to 2.9.  Notwithstanding J.H.'s lack of success in 
prior years, the IEP provided by the district for the 1987-88 
school year, J.H.'s grade 7, was virtually identical to the prior 
unsuccessful IEPs.  Dr. Howard Margolis, testifying as an expert 
on behalf of J.H. at trial, characterized J.H.'s placement as 
                     
5
.   Dr. Margolis, Ed.D., Reading and Special Education 
Consultant, in testimony before the administrative law judge and 
in a written evaluation report on J.H.'s educational program 
prior to his enrollment at Landmark, A. 2561 et seq., concluded 
that Bernardsville maintained a phonetics approach to reading 
year after year despite its inappropriateness given J.H.'s 
handicapping condition.  A. 2572.  The administrative law judge 
was persuaded by Dr. Margolis' findings and conclusions, and 
specifically found that J.H.'s reading program deprived J.H. an 
opportunity to acquire reading skills.  The district court 
endorsed the determination of the administrative law judge, 
specifically noting the inappropriateness of the reading program. 
  
inappropriate and not reasonably calculated to confer educational 
benefit on J.H. 
 In September of 1987, J.H.'s parents unilaterally 
removed J.H. from the Bernardsville school system and placed him 
at the Landmark School in Massachusetts, a residential school for 
handicapped children.  J.H. attended school at Landmark for 
academic years 1987-88 through 1989-90, J.H.'s grades 7, 8 and 9.  
In December of 1987 and November of 1988, at the request of 
J.H.'s parents, the Bernardsville District conducted educational 
assessments of J.H., but never approved J.H.'s placement at 
Landmark.   
 In September of 1989, after J.H. had been in attendance 
at Landmark for more than two years, the parents of J.H. 
petitioned for an administrative hearing concerning J.H.'s 
placement and program from September 1987 to his current 
situation, and sought retroactive reimbursement for J.H.'s out-
of-district residential schooling at Landmark.  The Board of 
Education denied J.H.'s parents' request for reimbursement and 
defended their proposed IEP for academic year 1987-88.  J.H.'s 
parents filed a new request for an administrative hearing on 
November 17, 1989.   
 Between November and December of 1989, the parties 
negotiated and reached various agreements, and the matter did not 
proceed to a hearing at that time.  The parties agreed that 
Deputy Public Advocate for the State of New Jersey, David Harris, 
would provide a release for Bernardsville to obtain the current 
records of J.H., that J.H. would be evaluated by the 
  
Bernardsville Child Study Team on December 22, 1989, that in 
early January, 1990, the Bernardsville school psychologist would 
visit Landmark to observe and evaluate J.H., that a meeting would 
be held to discuss the recommendations of the Child Study Team 
and that, if necessary, due process procedures could be 
activated. 
 Pursuant to the agreement, the Child Study Team did 
conduct a reevaluation of J.H. in order to develop an appropriate 
IEP.  On April 11, 1990, Lynn Caravello, Ed.D., Director of 
Special Services, advised J.H.'s parents that a new IEP had been 
developed for J.H. and recommended that J.H. be placed in the 
Bernards High School as a ninth grader eligible for part-time 
special education.     
 In May of 1990, J.H.'s parents removed J.H. from the 
eighth grade at Landmark and reenrolled him in the Bernardsville 
School.  Bernards High School implemented the newly developed IEP 
for the balance of the 1989-90 school year, and appeared to be 
responsive to Dr. Margolis' revisional recommendations for the 
1990-91 academic year.    
 On September 4, 1990, Mr. H. authorized J.H.'s 
placement in Bernards High School conditioned upon pending 
agreement on the IEP, and "upon agreement by the Bernardsville 
Board of Education that such placement [would] not thereby become 
the current educational placement of [J.H.] within the meaning of 
federal or state statutes and regulations pertaining to special 
education."  J.H. in fact completed the 1990-91 academic year as 
a tenth grader at Bernards High School. 
  
 On January 4, 1991, J.H.'s parents through their 
attorney filed a request for due process and for the matter to be 
transmitted to the office of administrative law for trial.  The 
petition contended that the Bernardsville Board of Education had 
offered an inappropriate program for J.H. through June of 1987, 
forcing J.H.'s parents to place J.H. at the Landmark School so as 
not to deprive him of his statutory right to a free appropriate 
public education.  The petition alleged among other things that 
the IEPs prepared by the Board of Education prior to J.H.'s 
enrollment at Landmark did not comply with the requirements of 
New Jersey Administrative Code 6:28-3.6 in that they were not 
reasonably calculated to confer any educational benefit upon 
J.H., and did not contain specific or measurable goals or 
instructional objectives.  The petition requested reimbursement 
for all monies expended on behalf of J.H. relative to his 
placement at the Landmark school commencing in the summer of 1987 
through May of 1990.  The matter was forwarded to the Office of 
Administrative Law on January 16, 1991, and hearings began on 
February 19, 1991. 
 On June 24, 1992, the administrative law judge decided 
the case against the Bernardsville Board of Education, ordering 
reimbursement to the parents of J.H. for Landmark tuition 
expenses for the academic years 1987-88 through 1989-90, 
excluding the cost of J.H.'s room and board.  Decision of 
Administrative Law Judge, OAL Dkt. No. EDS 576-91 (June 24, 
1992), A. 24-50.  In pertinent part, the administrative law judge 
found: 
  
 The [IEPs] were not compliant with the New 
Jersey Administrative Code as it then existed 
and, did not enable J.H. to receive either an 
appropriate education, or to best achieve 
educational success.[6]  Specifically, J.H.'s 
IEP's were severely lacking in adequate 
statements of current educational status, the 
annual goals were vague, non-specific and 
incapable of being measured, and repeated 
themselves, for the most part, in each 
succeeding year.   
 
 The IEP's . . . did not enable J.H. to 
improve in any meaningful way in his reading 
. . . .  
 
 Despite parental concern and intervention 
through regular contact and communication 
with the District and the hiring of tutors, 
J.H.'s lack of progress in reading caused him 
to suffer emotionally, and significantly 
affected his self-esteem.   
 
                     
6
.   The administrative law judge recognized that prior to 
May 15, 1989, the New Jersey standard for a free appropriate 
public education reflected in N.J.A.C. 6:28-2.1(a), was an 
education that would allow a handicapped child to best achieve 
success in learning.  Geis v. Board of Education, 774 F.2d 575, 
582 (3d Cir. 1985).  A. 47.  The Court further acknowledged that 
subsequent to May 15, 1989, the New Jersey Department of 
Education rejected the Geis standard in favor of the federal 
standard set forth in the Education For All Handicapped Act, 20 
U.S.C. § 1400 et seq., which was defined as an education which 
merely confers educational benefit on a handicapped person.  The 
1989 amended N.J.A.C. 6:28-1.1 specifically provides that New 
Jersey is obliged to ensure that all educationally disabled 
pupils "have available to them a free, appropriate public 
education as that standard is set under the [federal Act]," 20 
U.S.C. § 1400 et seq.  (Emphasis added.)  See Board of Education 
v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176 (1982). 
 
 The administrative law judge determined that for all 
the relevant time periods, including 1982 through May 15, 1989, 
the standard set forth in Geis was operative, and found that 
under the more stringent local standard, the Bernardsville Board 
of Education failed to comply with the procedural requirements of 
N.J.A.C. 6:28-1.1.  A. 48. 
  
 As a result, J.H. had significant problems 
with his peers and socialization . . . . 
 
 Although one-to-one instruction in reading 
was recommended by independent evaluations 
. . . with little exception, the same was not 
offered to J.H. . . . . 
 
 The program offered to J.H for seventh grade 
. . . was a continuation of prior programs 
which did not address J.H.'s handicapping 
condition.   
 
 Petitioners were justified in seeking a free, 
appropriate public education under the 
circumstances recognizing that J.H.'s reading 
handicap was not being addressed.   
 
 . . . [P]etitioners [sic] decision to enroll 
[J.H. in the Landmark School] was reasonable.   
 The program at Landmark School was 
appropriate for J.H. to meet his needs, and 
offered the best opportunity to enable J.H. 
to achieve educational success and benefit 
from his education.   
 
OAL Dkt. No. EDS 576-91, pp.19-20; A. 42-43. 
 The Bernardsville Board of Education appealed the 
matter to the United States District Court for the District of 
New Jersey on September 2, 1993 pursuant to 20 U.S.C. § 
1415(e)(2).7  Bernardsville Board of Education v. J.H., Civil No. 
92-3694 (D.N.J. March 22, 1993).  The parents of J.H. moved for 
                     
7
.   Section 1415(e)(2) provides in pertinent part: 
 
  Any party aggrieved by the 
[administrative] findings and decision . . . 
shall have the right to bring a civil action 
with respect to the complaint presented 
pursuant to this section, which action may be 
brought in any State court of competent 
jurisdiction or in a district court of the 
United States without regard to the amount in 
controversy. . . . 
  
summary judgment on the ground that the Board of Education's 
appeal was untimely under 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2).  Following the 
opinion of this circuit in Tokarcik v. Forest Hills School 
District, 665 F.2d 443, 450-54 (3d Cir. 1981) (30-day state 
limitation statute for state administrative appeals to state 
courts does not apply to federal claim brought in federal court 
under Education of Handicapped Act), cert. denied, 458 U.S. 1121 
(1982), the district court dismissed J.H.'s parents' summary 
judgment motion.  The district court denied the Board of 
Education's cross-motion for summary judgment brought on the 
ground that J.H.'s parents waived their right to reimbursement by 
unilaterally placing J.H. in Landmark and failing to initiate 
review proceedings prior to seeking reimbursement.  The district 
court also denied the Board of Education's alternative argument 
for summary judgment that J.H.'s parents failed to comply with 
the 90-day statute of limitations contained in N.J.A.C. 6:24-
1.2(c), which the Board argued should be applied to challenges to 
IEPs.  The court noted that the New Jersey Administrative Code 
does not contain any explicit time limitation within which a 
party must request a due process hearing in the special education 
context, and no caselaw has held that the 90-day time limit would 
be applicable.   
 Prior to trial, on September 9, 1993, the district 
court ruled on the parties' motions in limine.  J.H.'s parents 
had filed a motion seeking to limit the testimony of two expert 
witnesses for the Board of Education, Joanne Seelaus, school 
psychologist and Supervisor of Special Education, and Dr. Lynn 
  
Caravello, Director of Special Services for the Bernardsville 
Board of Education.  Seelaus and Caravello had prepared a joint 
report which contained references to the IEP prepared for J.H. 
for the 1987-88 school year, references to testimony previously 
given during the administrative hearing, and references to the 
reevaluation of J.H. preparatory to his return to the district in 
1990.  The court excluded these portions of their testimony on 
the ground that such evidence would have been cumulative and 
improper "additional evidence" pursuant to 20 U.S.C. § 
1415(e)(2),8 and with regard to that portion of the report 
discussing J.H.'s anticipated return to Bernardsville in the fall 
of 1990, that it would have been irrelevant to the request for 
reimbursement for tuition from 1987 through the spring of 1990. 
 The district court also granted the Board of 
Education's motion to preclude J.H.'s parents from testifying at 
the hearing about issues that they had already or could have 
addressed at the administrative proceeding.   
 The court ruled on the merits of the appeal on November 
15, 1993, after conducting a de novo review of the state 
administrative decision.  Affording the administrative law judge 
                     
8
.   Section 1415(e)(2) provides in pertinent part: 
 
 . . . In any action brought under this 
paragraph the court shall receive the records 
of the administrative proceedings, shall hear 
additional evidence at the request of a 
party, and basing its decision on the 
preponderance of the evidence, shall grant 
such relief as the court determines is 
appropriate. 
  
due deference in consideration of a perceived expertise on the 
part of the administrative agency to articulate state educational 
policy, and with respect to the administrative law judge's 
credibility determinations, the district court concluded that the 
Bernardsville School District failed to confer upon J.H. even the 
minimally satisfactory educational benefit under the least 
stringent standard which could arguably have been applied.  The 
district court concluded that the IEPs developed for J.H. during 
the relevant school years were not reasonably calculated to 
confer an educational benefit.  After an independent examination 
of the record, the district court affirmed the administrative law 
judge's specific findings, including that the IEPs did not 
contain adequate statements of current educational status or 
measurable annual goals, were virtually redundant from year to 
year and hence unresponsive to J.H.'s apparent difficulties, and 
that Bernardsville failed to offer J.H. adequate one-to-one 
instruction.  The district court held that Bernardsville failed 
to sustain its burden of proof to show by a preponderance that 
its IEPs provided J.H. with a free, appropriate, public 
education, and further held that the Landmark placement was 
appropriate.   
 On equitable considerations and on the power conferred 
on the district court by 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2) to "grant such 
relief as the court determines is appropriate," the district 
court awarded J.H.'s parents retroactive reimbursement of 
Landmark School tuition, exclusive of room and board, for 
academic years 1987-88 through 1989-90, affirming the order of 
  
the administrative law judge.  The court further designated 
J.H.'s parents as the prevailing party for purposes of awarding 
attorney's fees and costs pursuant to 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(4)(B),9 
but left open the determination of the specific calculation of 
reasonable fees.  By order of the court on February 2, 1994, the 
award of attorney's fees was set in the amount of $91,494.85.     
 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, on December 14, 1993, the 
Bernardsville Board of Education timely appealed the final order 
of the district court of November 15, 1993, which affirmed the 
decision of the administrative law judge, and from the February 
2, 1994, order of the district court awarding attorney's fees.10  
The Board of Education also appealed the two interlocutory 
                     
9
.   Section 1415(e)(4)(B) provides: 
 
  In any action or proceeding brought 
under this subsection, the court, in its 
discretion, may award reasonable attorneys' 
fees as part of the costs to the parents or 
guardian of a handicapped child or youth who 
is the prevailing party. 
10
.   Although Bernardsville's notice of appeal explicitly 
specifies only the district court's November 15, 1993 order and 
opinion, we construe the notice as incorporating the unspecified 
February 2, 1994 order quantifying the attorneys' fees award.   
Because the November order designates the prevailing party for 
purposes of attorneys' fees, we recognize an adequate connection 
between it and the February 2 order for purposes of extending our 
jurisdiction over the latter, given that the subsequent appellate 
proceedings manifest the appellant's intent to appeal the 
attorneys' fees issue.  Importantly, here the opposing party had 
and exercised a full opportunity to brief the issue and did not 
raise any claim of prejudice.  A copy of the district court's 
February 2 order and opinion setting the attorneys' fees was also 
attached to the appellant's brief.  See Williams v. Guzzardi, 875 
F.2d 46, 49 (3d Cir. 1989) (and cases cited therein).   
  
opinions denying its motion for summary judgment and excluding 
the testimonies of two witnesses.  
 
 II. 
 Upon an examination of the record on appeal, we are 
confident that the district court properly ruled that, under any 
arguably appropriate legal standard, the Bernardsville Board of 
Education failed to establish by a preponderance that its program 
and placement for J.H. assured him a free, appropriate, public 
education as required under the Education of the Handicapped Act, 
20 U.S.C. § 1412(1).11  The record bespeaks an appalling failure 
                     
11
.   The Education of the Handicapped Act, 20 U.S.C.§ 1400 
et seq., now known as the Individuals With Disabilities Education 
Act ("IDEA"), provides federal financial assistance to states and 
local agencies for the education of handicapped children, 
provided that the state can demonstrate that it "has in effect a 
policy that assures all children with disabilities the right to a 
free appropriate public education."  20 U.S.C.§ 1412(1).  In 
Board of Education v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 200-04 (1982), the 
Supreme Court held that the Federal Act requires state or local 
school districts to provide a program designed to confer an 
educational benefit on the child.   
 
 The state of New Jersey implements the Federal Act 
through state statute and regulations promulgated by the New 
Jersey State Board of Education.  N.J.S.A. §§ 18A:46-1 through 
18A:46-46.  Until May 15, 1989, New Jersey law established a 
higher standard for local school boards than the Act mandates, 
requiring not only that the program be designed to confer an 
educational benefit, but that the program be designed to permit 
the child to best achieve success in education.  N.J.A.C. § 6:28-
2.1 (1978).  See Geis v. Board of Education, 774 F.2d 575, 582-83 
(3d Cir. 1985).  Furthermore, New Jersey statutes set forth in 
detail the specific requirements for each Individualized 
Education Program.  N.J.A.C. §§ 6:28-3.6; 6:28-1.1 et seq. 
 
 Because we agree with the district court that the Board 
of Education failed under either standard, we need not address 
the parties' contentions as to which standard applies.  
  
on the part of the education bureaucracy to develop and implement 
an appropriate IEP.  We will not belabor this point.  We turn our 
attention directly to the question of the timeliness of J.H.'s 
parents' request for reimbursement. 
 
 A. 
 The Bernardsville Board of Education contends that 
J.H.'s parents' more than two year delay in commencing the review 
process renders their claim ineligible for reimbursement for any 
portion of the private tuition in question.  The Board cites a 
number of cases in which parents have been awarded prospective 
private school tuition and/or expenses incurred while a challenge 
to the student's IEP was pending through administrative review to 
support its position that parents must commence the review 
process in order to be entitled to relief.12  See, e.g., School 
Committee of Burlington v. Department of Education, 471 U.S. 359, 
370 (1985) (Act authorizes prospective injunction and 
                     
12
.   Caselaw qualifies 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(3), which 
provides: 
 
  During the pendency of any proceedings 
. . ., unless the State or local educational 
agency and the parents or guardian otherwise 
agree, the child shall remain in the then 
current educational placement of such child . 
. . . 
 
 Authorization for a judicial grant of retroactive 
reimbursement for interim unilateral placements ultimately proven 
to be reasonable and appropriate, where the IEP is adjudged 
inappropriate, is justified under the court's equitable powers to 
grant appropriate relief under 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2). 
  
reimbursement for appropriate unilateral private placement during 
interim pending review of public placement later adjudged 
inappropriate); Lascari v. Board of Education, 116 N.J. 30, 50, 
560 A.2d 1180 (1989) (parents may be reimbursed for private 
school tuition during pendency of any proceeding which determines 
that the district's IEP was inappropriate); Garland Independent 
School Dist. v. Wilks, 657 F. Supp. 1163, 1167 (N.D. Tex. 1987) 
(parent not entitled to tuition reimbursement incurred prior to 
bringing dissatisfaction with district's IEP to school district's 
attention); Lewisville Independent School District v. Brooke P., 
16 EHLR 1313, 1315-16 (E.D. Tex. 1990) (parents' failure to 
request due process hearing constitutes waiver of right to 
reimbursement for cost of extended school year services prior to 
initiation of due process proceedings, but court ordered 
prospective injunction against school district); but cf. 
Northeast Central School Dist. v. Sobol, 170 A.D.2d 80, 85-87, 
572 N.Y.S.2d 752, 755-57 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991) (the ability to 
order retroactive reimbursement within the statutory context and 
public policy is necessary to ensure a child's right to a free, 
appropriate, public education).  Thus, Bernardsville argues that 
reimbursement for J.H.'s private placement prior to commencement 
of review proceedings is not warranted in this case, and that the 
district court erroneously denied the Board of Education's motion 
for summary judgment.    
 J.H.'s parents assert that the caselaw in this area 
does not explicitly, or necessarily by inference, preclude pre-
proceedings reimbursement; they argue that costs incurred 
  
subsequent to their expressions of dissatisfaction with J.H.'s 
IEP, before they officially commenced a review, should be 
reimbursed.  J.H.'s parents informed the Board of Education of 
their concerns regarding J.H.'s program and placement in August 
of 1987 and requested placement at Landmark.  The Board denied 
that request, but since at least that time the Board was arguably 
on effective notice of the IEP's inadequacy and the Board's 
potential liability to J.H.'s parents.  Furthermore, the Board's 
annual monitoring of J.H.'s program and progress while at 
Landmark served to keep the Board on notice for the duration of 
J.H.'s out-of-district enrollment.   
 J.H.'s parents' argument is not without merit.  The 
fact that here the regulations do not specify a time limitation 
within which to bring a due process hearing, as well as the very 
nature and social significance of the education of children with 
disabilities, incline us to equitable considerations.  The fact 
that the school district was notified of the parents' 
dissatisfaction, albeit not through the initiation of official 
proceedings, from the very first summer that J.H. attended 
Landmark, that the parents did request a new placement for J.H., 
and that there was continued contact between the school district 
and J.H. for the duration of J.H.'s enrollment at Landmark 
support Mr. and Mrs. H's argument.  There is no evidence 
whatsoever that J.H.'s parents acted in bad faith, and given the 
apparent severe deficiencies in the IEPs developed for J.H. at 
Bernardsville, it is clear that J.H.'s parents acted reasonably 
in securing an appropriate education for their son outside the 
  
district.  At the time J.H. left Bernardsville, the IEP developed 
for him was both procedurally and substantively inadequate, and 
it is untenable for the school district to maintain the argument 
that it was not aware of a problem with the IEP it offered, 
virtually unmodified, to J.H. year after year despite his lack of 
academic progress, and in the face of his social regression.  We 
do not hesitate to affirm the right to reimbursement for private 
tuition incurred from a unilateral enrollment during the pendency 
of any proceeding if it is ultimately determined that the IEP in 
question was inappropriate.  See Burlington, 471 U.S. at 370, and 
related cases cited above.  
 Nevertheless, here, where proceedings were initiated 
more than two years after J.H.'s transfer, we must place into our 
equation the practical opportunity afforded the school district 
to modify its IEP or to determine definitively whether 
expenditures occurred outside the district could have been 
obviated by the filing of a prompt complaint.  We are cognizant 
of the fact that the school district serves a very large student 
population, and in light of the numerous contacts it has with 
parents seeking the individual welfare of their respective 
children, mere notice of parental "dissatisfaction" does not 
alone put the Board on reasonable notice that the parents will 
challenge a particular IEP in the future and seek reimbursement 
for an interim unilateral placement in a private institution.  
Absent initiation of review proceedings within a reasonable time 
of a unilateral decision to transfer a child to a private 
institution, a school district would not know to continue to 
  
review and revise an IEP, and the court would be left to hazard 
conjecture or hypothesis as to what the Board of Education might 
have proposed if it had been informed of the parents' continued 
intent to pursue an appropriate education for their child within 
the school district.  We, of course, recognize that the school 
district has the duty in the first instance to provide an 
appropriate IEP, and moreover, to demonstrate by a preponderance 
at a due process hearing that the IEP it offered was indeed 
appropriate.  With that foremost in mind, we must nevertheless 
also recognize that as a practical reality, and as a matter of 
procedural law13 of which J.H.'s parents were fully apprised, the 
right of review contains a corresponding parental duty to 
                     
13
.   The IDEA, 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(1)(E), requires that the 
state or local agency receiving federal funds under the Act 
provide a grievance process with regard to the placement and 
programs offered to any child.  Section 1415(b)(2) requires that 
the state or appropriate state agency provide parents who have 
filed a complaint the opportunity for an impartial due process 
administrative hearing.  Section 1415(e)(2) provides for appeal 
from the decision of such a hearing to any state court of 
competent jurisdiction, or to a United States district court 
without regard to amount in controversy.   
 
 New Jersey implements the IDEA with extensive statutory 
and regulatory provisions designed to provide any parent who 
believes that his or her child is being or has been denied the 
rights secured by IDEA an opportunity for mediation and an 
impartial due process administrative hearing.  N.J.S.A. 18A:46-1-
46 and N.J.A.C. 6:28-1-11.  The New Jersey Administrative Code 
requires that parents be sent a copy and explanation of all 
procedures pertaining to the IDEA and the New Jersey Code.  
N.J.A.C. 1:6A-2.1 et seq. 
 
 It is undisputed that in 1987 J.H.'s parents received 
this information regarding the proper steps to invoke the 
administrative review process, but delayed invoking their rights 
to any part of the administrative process until more than two 
years after unilaterally placing J.H. at Landmark. 
  
unequivocally place in issue the appropriateness of an IEP.  This 
is accomplished through the initiation of review proceedings 
within a reasonable time of the unilateral placement for which 
reimbursement is sought.  We think more than two years, indeed, 
more than one year, without mitigating excuse, is an unreasonable 
delay.14  We will vacate the district court's November 15, 1993 
                     
14
.   We concur largely with the dissent, except, of course, 
on the critical issue of whether the Act implicitly can recognize 
a duty on the part of the parents to place in question the 
appropriateness of the IEP within a reasonable time of the year 
for which they seek reimbursement.  We certainly agree that the 
handicapped child's education is an interest both of the parents 
and of the district, and that here the parents' decision to 
withdraw J.H. was reasonable.  Nevertheless, we believe that the 
provisions of the Act can only be effectively and fairly 
implemented if we recognize that the interest of both the parents 
and the district on behalf of the child bear a corresponding 
respective duty -- on the district to develop and justify its 
IEP, and on the parents to unambiguously challenge the IEP when 
they think it inappropriate.  We think this allocation of burdens 
comports fully with the Act and the relevant implementing 
regulations.   
 
 We note, as does the dissent, that given the Act's lack 
of specificity on the question of timeliness and the nature of 
the issue here, a balancing of the equities is unavoidable.  We 
resort to the standard of reasonableness under the circumstances, 
and a consideration of mitigating circumstances for any delay in 
the initiation of review proceedings which might otherwise be 
deemed unreasonable.  Our disagreement with the dissent is over 
the questions of whether the unmitigated delay here was 
reasonable, and, perhaps more dispositive, whether the district 
was placed on reasonably adequate notice of the parents' 
intention to seek reimbursement. 
 
 We wish to clarify that our weighing of the equities 
was not unduly influenced by the isolated fact that the district 
must cope with a large student population, as the dissent perhaps 
implies, although we believe that this fact has relevance to the 
question of what constitutes reasonably adequate notice in these 
particular circumstances.  We agree with the dissent, however, 
that the Act imposes the same duty to provide a free, appropriate 
education to a child in a large urban district as it does to a 
child in a small urban community. 
  
order directing Bernardsville to reimburse Mr. & Mrs. H. for 




 The issue of retroactive reimbursement for the school 
year 1989-90 requires closer scrutiny of the equities.  At the 
beginning of the 1989-90 academic year, J.H.'s parents sought an 
administrative hearing regarding J.H.'s placement and began 
intensive negotiations with Bernardsville resulting in a reentry 
of J.H. in a newly developed IEP within the district shortly 
before that academic year expired.  J.H.'s parents subsequently 
continued actively to pursue the review process, and ultimately 
requested a due process hearing for retroactive reimbursement in 
the middle of academic year 1990-91.  Thus from the beginning of 
1989-90, J.H.'s parents set in motion the firm steps which fairly 
notified the school board that retroactive liability was a 
possibility and afforded the board a fair opportunity to revise 
its IEP for J.H. 
 The Board of Education asserts that the district court 
was constrained to dismiss even the reimbursement request for 
1989-90 as time-barred pursuant to the 90-day rule set forth in 
N.J.A.C. 6:24-1.2.  That provision provides in relevant part: 
                     
15
.   Because the circumstances here make this case merely 
analogous to the caselaw upon which the Board of Education 
relies, the district court properly denied the Board of 
Education's motion for summary judgment based on the parents' 
late initiation of review proceedings. 
  
 (a)  To initiate a contested case for the 
Commissioner's determination of a controversy 
or dispute arising under the school laws, a 
petitioner shall serve a copy of a petition 
upon each respondent . . . .                                                                                       
*  *  *                  
 
 (c)  The petitioner shall file a petition no 
later than the 90th day from the date of 
receipt of the notice of a final order, 
ruling or other action by the district board 
of education, individual party, or agency, 
which is the subject of the requested 
contested case hearing. 
 
The Board of Education cites a number of cases in which the 90-
day rule has been applied in the education context.  See North 
Plainfield Education Assoc. v. Board of Education, 96 N.J. 587, 
594, 476 A.2d 1245 (1984) (because award of teacher salary scale 
increment is not statutory right, it is subject to 90-day time 
bar); Riely v. Board of Education, 173 N.J. Super. 109, 113-14, 
413 A.2d 628 (App. Div. 1980) (teacher's petition of appeal with 
Commissioner of Education concerning reinstatement time-barred by 
90-day rule, and pendency of arbitration does not relieve 
compliance with 90-day rule); Lombardi v. Board of Education, OAL 
Dkt. No. EDU 6808-86 (January 30, 1987) (Commissioner of 
Education); Markman v. Board of Education , OAL Dkt. No. EDU 
0317-86 (August 22, 1986) (Commissioner of Education).   
 In addition to citing arguably supporting caselaw, the 
Board of Education contends that the scheme of the New Jersey 
Code also compels application of the 90-day rule.  The Board 
cites N.J.A.C. 1:6 A-1.1, which provides: 
  The rules in this chapter shall apply to 
the notice and hearing of matters arising out 
of the Special Education Program of the 
  
Department of Education, pursuant to N.J.A.C. 
6:28.  Any aspect of notice and hearing not 
covered by these special rules shall be 
governed by the Uniform Administrative 
Procedure Rules (U.A.P.R.) contained in 
N.J.A.C. 1:1 . . . . 
 
N.J.A.C. 1:1-3.1 provides: 
 
  A contested case shall be commenced in 
the State agency with appropriate subject 
matter jurisdiction.  A contested case may be 
commenced by the agency itself or by an 
individual or entity as provided in the rules 
and regulations of the agency. 
 
 The appropriate state agency here is the Commissioner 
of Education.  N.J.A.C. 6:24-1.2 is the code provision which 
limits the time within which a parent may seek a hearing before 
an administrative law judge for the Commissioner of Education.  
Thus the Board argues that N.J.A.C. 6:24-1.2(c), which sets forth 
the 90-day rule, mandated that J.H.'s parents file a petition 
with the Commissioner within 90 days from receipt of the disputed 
IEP, and that their delay results in a time-bar from all relief. 
 We have already decided that a mere expression of 
dissatisfaction with a proposed IEP and placement is not 
sufficient to guarantee retroactive reimbursement for the cost of 
a reasonable unilateral placement, even where the IEP is 
ultimately found to have been inappropriate.  Even a liberal 
understanding of the operative policies of the IDEA cannot 
obviate the practical necessity for a reasonable timeframe for 
filing due process claims.  Nevertheless, we find no precedent 
for applying the 90-day rule to special education matters, though 
undoubtedly that limitation applies to disputes arising under 
  
school laws other than special education matters.  The district 
court accurately noted that the rules which expressly pertain to 
special education do not contain a time limit, and no caselaw has 
adopted the 90-day rule in the context of the IDEA.  The district 
court correctly rejected the 90-day rule here. 
 Under the facts of this case in light of all the 
equities, recognizing the operative policies of the IDEA and 
acknowledging all relevant statutes and regulations, we believe 
that J.H.'s parents adequately placed in issue their 
dissatisfaction with J.H.'s IEP for purposes of reimbursement at 
the time they requested an administrative hearing in September of 
1989.  Due process procedures were not activated at that time 
only because the parties were attempting to negotiate a 
settlement.  A formal request for due process was eventually made 
when it became apparent that a resolution could not otherwise be 
negotiated.  Although we cannot award compensation for 
Bernardsville's past failure to provide J.H. a free appropriate 
public education, we believe substantial justice can be achieved 
by awarding reimbursement for tuition costs incurred while in 
attendance at Landmark for the 1989-90 academic year.  We will 
affirm the district court's award of reimbursement tuition costs 
for the 1989-90 school year, excluding the costs associated with 
room and board.16 
                     
16
.   We reject the Board of Education's argument that 
reimbursement for academic year 1989-90 should be precluded on 
the ground that it was incapable of formulating a timely IEP for 
that year, given the unilateral action of J.H.'s parents.  
Bernardsville's long history with J.H. and its continued contact 




 In light of the IDEA, 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(4)(B), which 
provides that "the court, in its discretion, may award reasonable 
attorneys' fees as part of the costs to the parents or guardian 
of a handicapped child or youth who is the prevailing party," and 
consistent with our holding, we must vacate the district court's 
February 2, 1994 order awarding full attorneys' fees in the 
amount of $91,494.85.  We find, however, that the district court 
was correct in its rejection of the Board of Education's 
contention that the court should disallow those fees associated 
with J.H.'s parents' motion for summary judgment pertaining to a 
statute of limitations issue on appeal.  We find that counsel for 
J.H. has made "a good-faith effort to exclude from [the] fee 
request hours that are excessive, redundant, or otherwise 
unnecessary," and has exercised sound billing judgment as 
required in Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 434 (1983) 
(citing Copeland v. Marshall, 641 F.2d 880, 891 (D.C. Cir. 1980) 
(en banc)).  We also find that the district court did not err in 
its acceptance of the $235 hourly billing rate charged by counsel 
for J.H. as reasonable in light of comparable prevailing rates.  
 Furthermore, we agree with the district court that the 
award of fees should not be reduced to reflect J.H.'s counsel's 
(..continued) 
unilateral act belie this contention.  Under a just and proper 
consideration of the equities and the court's discretionary power 
to grant "appropriate" relief, which includes a qualified power 
to grant retroactive reimbursement, we are convinced of the 
appropriateness of an award for the 1989-90 year. 
  
partial success by virtue of the district court's refusal to 
award reimbursement costs for room and board as requested.  The 
issue of reimbursement for residential costs involved a "common 
core of facts" relative to the issue of tuition reimbursement, 
was based on "related legal theories," and cannot be viewed as a 
discrete claim capable of disassociation from the tuition claim 
for purposes of awarding attorneys' fees.  Id. at 435.  
Nevertheless, since J.H. has failed to prevail on his claim for 
reimbursement costs for academic years 1987-88 and 1988-89, we 
must remand to the district court to calculate an appropriate 
reduced fee award to reflect the adjusted scope of J.H.'s 
success.    
 
 IV. 
 Lastly, the Board of Education argues that the district 
court erroneously excluded the testimonies of Dr. Lynn Caravello, 
the Director of Special Services at the time J.H. reentered the 
Bernardsville School District in 1990, and Ms. Joanne Seelaus, 
school psychologist, from the de novo hearing the district court 
held.  The Board of Education sought to admit a joint report 
prepared by Dr. Caravello and Ms. Seelaus which included a 
reevaluation of J.H. in anticipation of his return and other 
information relevant to the 1990-91 IEP prepared for J.H.  
 During the prior administrative law hearing, the 
administrative law judge had excluded this report.  Nevertheless, 
Ms. Seelaus had offered testimony at the hearing on the Board's 
behalf exclusive of matters concerning J.H.'s post-reentry 
  
experience.  Dr. Caravello had also been present and available to 
testify before the administrative law judge on June 4, 1991, 
although she did not testify.   
 At the district court hearing, the court excluded their 
testimony in part on the ground that the IEP subsequently 
developed for J.H. in 1990-91, which was not at issue in the 
present litigation, was irrelevant to the issue of the 
appropriateness of the public education offered to J.H. in the 
prior contested years.  The district court further held that the 
testimony would be cumulative and would improperly embellish 
testimony previously given at the administrative hearing.  Order 
of the District Court, Civ. No. 92-3694 (D.N.J. Sept. 9, 1993).  
See Burlington v. Department of Education, 736 F.2d 773, 790-91 
(1st Cir. 1984) ("additional evidence" under 20 U.S.C. § 
1415(e)(2) "does not authorize witnesses at trial to repeat or 
embellish their prior administrative hearing testimony"; the 
trial court in its discretion must not allow "such evidence to 
change the character of the hearing from one of review to a trial 
de novo"), aff'd, 471 U.S. 359 (1985); Egg Harbor Township Board 
of Education v. S.O., by his Guardian ad litem, R.O., Civil 
Action No. 90-1043, slip op. at 3 n.1 (D.N.J. Aug. 19, 
1992)("additional evidence" under 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2) should 
not be cumulative, introduced to impeach credibility of 
administrative hearing witnesses, nor embellish testimony from 
the administrative hearing, and should not have been available 
for proffer during the administrative hearing). 
  
 We do not find any error of law or abuse of discretion 
in the district court's decision to exclude the joint report on 
J.H.'s parents' motion in limine.  The Bernardsville School 
District's performance with regard to the IEP it developed for 
J.H. for the 1990-91 school year and for prospective years are 
not at issue here and admission of the joint report would not 
affect the disposition of this case.   
 
 V. 
 We will thus vacate that portion of the district 
court's November 15, 1993 judgment which awards J.H.'s parents 
reimbursement for tuition at the Landmark School for the academic 
years 1987-88 and 1988-89, and we will affirm that portion which 
awards J.H.'s parents reimbursement for tuition at the Landmark 
School for academic year 1989-90.  Although we agree with the 
district court's designation of J.H.'s parents as a "prevailing 
party" pursuant to 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(4)(B), we will vacate the 
amount of attorneys' fees set by the district court by order 
dated February 2, 1994, and remand to the district court for 
recalculation. 
BERNARDSVILLE BOARD OF EDUCATION V. J.H., ET AL. 
NO. 93-5767  
 
 
 MCKEE, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part. 
  I concur with Part IV of the majority opinion. In 
addition, I agree that J.H.'s parents are entitled to 
reimbursement for the 1989-90 academic year and thus concur with 
Part II B of the majority opinion.  However, I believe that 
J.H.'s parents are entitled to be reimbursed for 1987-88 and 
1988-89 as well.  Therefore, I respectfully dissent from Part II 
A of the majority opinion.  
 I. 
  The majority errs by allowing the timeliness of 
the parents' request for due process to define and control its 
analysis.17  The majority states: 
[W]here proceedings were initiated more than 
two years after J.H.’s transfer, we must 
place into our equation the practical 
opportunity afforded the school district to 
modify its IEP or to determine definitively 
whether expenditures occurred outside the 
district could have been obviated by the 
filing of a prompt complaint. . . . We, of 
course, recognize that the school district 
has the duty in the first instance to provide 
an appropriate IEP, and moreover, to 
demonstrate by a preponderance at a due 
process hearing that the IEP it offered was 
indeed appropriate.  With that foremost in 
mind, we must nevertheless also recognize 
that as a practical reality, and as a matter 
of procedural law of which J.H.’s parents 
were fully apprised, the right of review 
contains a corresponding parental duty to 
                     
     
17
 Because I agree with much of the majority’s assessment of 
this case, I take the liberty of quoting at length from the 
majority opinion in explaining my reasons for dissenting.   
  
unequivocally place in issue the 
appropriateness of an IEP. This is 
accomplished through the initiation of review 
proceedings within a reasonable time of the 
unilateral placement . . . . We think more 
than two years, indeed, more than one year, 
without mitigating excuse, is an unreasonable 
delay. 
 
Majority opinion at 20-22 (footnote omitted). 
 
  I do not agree that the Act "contains a 
corresponding parental duty."  The Act does not state that the 
parental right to reimbursement is conditioned upon the parents' 
request for a due process hearing.  Further, the Act does not 
specify a time frame within which parents must seek evaluation of 
an IEP upon pain of forfeiting their child’s right to the 
benefits of the Act.  “[B]oth the parents and the district have 
an interest in assuring that a handicapped child receives an 
appropriate education."  Lascari v. Board of Educ., 560 A.2d 
1180, 1188 (N.J. 1989) (emphasis added).  I fail to see where the 
Act imposes the unilateral parental obligation to which the 
majority refers and it clearly does not impose a time limitation 
upon the district court's authority to grant retroactive 
reimbursement.  The majority has effectively amended the Act in a 
manner which is inconsistent with its purpose and with the 
remedial authority that the Act vests in a district court. 
  A district court's power to award retroactive 
reimbursement arises from its authority to grant relief that 
effectuates the provisions of the Act.  
The statute directs the court to ‘grant such 
relief as [it] determines is appropriate.' 
  
The ordinary meaning of these words confers 
broad discretion on the court. The type of 
relief is not further specified, except that 
it must be 'appropriate.' Absent other 
reference, the only possible interpretation 
is that relief is to be 'appropriate' in 
light of the purpose of the Act. 
 
School Comm. of Burlington v. Department of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 
369 (1985) (emphasis added).  The purpose of the Act is "'to 
assure that all handicapped children have available to them . . . 
a free appropriate public education which emphasizes special 
education . . . designed to meet their unique needs [and] to 
assure that the rights of handicapped children and their parents 
. . . are protected.'"  Id. at 367 (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c)).  
The Supreme Court in Burlington unequivocally declared that “a 
free appropriate public education” means “special education and 
related services which [] have been provided at public expense, 
under public supervision and direction, and without charge . . . 
.” Id. at 367-68 (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1401(18)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
  The Act clearly requires that a school district 
provide a free appropriate education for eligible students.  
Thus, the issue before us is not "whether J.H.'s parents 
requested due process for their son within an appropriate time 
limitation," as the majority states.  See majority opinion at 3.  
Rather, the issue we should address is whether the requested 
relief is "appropriate" in light of the purposes of the Act.  
  
  Accordingly, we must examine the circumstances 
surrounding the request for reimbursement.  Our analysis should 
examine the length of the delay in requesting formal due process 
and the number of years for which compensation is requested, the 
adequacy of the IEP that caused the parents to withdraw J.H., the 
bona fides of the parties, and the school district's notice of 
the problem and of the likelihood that it may be asked to 
reimburse J.H.'s parents.  
  The Length of the Delay. 
  This is not a case of parents seeking 
reimbursement for an entire elementary and secondary education 
after allowing many years to pass before requesting a due process 
hearing.  The delay in commencing due process was not exorbitant.  
Moreover, "[t]he fact that here the regulations do not specify a 
time limitation within which to bring a due process hearing, as 
well as the very nature and social significance of the education 
of children with disabilities, [should] incline us to equitable 
considerations."  Majority opinion at 19.  Furthermore, although 
the school district would no doubt prefer to avoid any additional 
expenditures, the school district does not claim that the cost of 
having to reimburse J.H.'s parents for J.H.'s entire three years 
at Landmark will interfere with its ability to educate other 
children.   
  The IEP. 
  
  The IEP that caused J.H.'s parents to withdraw him 
from Bernardsville was, indeed, woefully inadequate.  The 
majority opinion sets forth at length the inadequacy of that 
IEP18 and appropriately concludes that “[t]he record bespeaks an 
appalling failure on the part of the educational bureaucracy to 
develop and implement an appropriate IEP.”  Majority opinion at 
16-17.  Moreover, 
the district court concluded that the 
Bernardsville School District failed to 
confer upon J.H. even the minimally 
satisfactory educational benefit under the 
least stringent standard which could arguably 
have been applied, and that the IEPs 
developed for J.H. during the relevant school 
years were not reasonably calculated to 
confer an educational benefit. . . .  [T]he 
district court affirmed the administrative 
law judge’s specific findings, including that 
the IEPs did not contain adequate statements 
of current educational status or measurable 
annual goals, were virtually redundant from 
year to year and hence unresponsive to J.H.’s 
apparent difficulties . . . .  
 
Majority opinion at 14.  In short, "the IEP developed for [J.H.] 
was both procedurally and substantively inadequate."  Majority 
opinion at 20.  It is thus little wonder that J.H. failed to 
progress educationally, socially, or developmentally from 
kindergarten to seventh grade when his parents finally said 
“enough” and withdrew him from the Bernardsville district. 
  The Good Faith of the Parties. 
                     
18
 See majority opinion at 10-11. 
  
  "There is no evidence whatsoever that J.H.’s 
parents acted in bad faith, and given the severe deficiencies in 
the IEPs developed for J.H. at Bernardsville, it is clear that 
J.H.’s parents acted reasonably . . . .”  Majority opinion at 19-
20. Indeed, given their concern for their child, they had no 
option but to withdraw J.H. from the Bernardsville district. 
  The good faith of J.H.’s parents is in stark 
contrast to the attitude and behavior of the school district.  
J.H.’s placement at Bernardsville was "inappropriate and not 
reasonably calculated to confer educational benefit on J.H.”  
Majority opinion at 7. “Year after year the School District 
failed to design an Individualized Educational Program suitable 
to J.H.’s special needs, and failed to intervene responsibly in 
his quite apparent trend of academic and social deterioration.”  
Majority opinion at 2.   Thus, the school district almost totally 
disregarded its duty to J.H. and his welfare.  
  Notice. 
  The Bernardsville District had been aware of 
J.H.’s developmental problems since J.H.'s enrollment in 
kindergarten.  J.H. had been evaluated and assessed by the 
appropriate school personnel since J.H.’s earliest days in the 
Bernardsville School District.  Accordingly, “it is untenable for 
the school district to maintain the argument that it was not 
aware of a problem with the IEP it offered, virtually unmodified, 
to J.H. year after year despite his lack of academic progress, 
  
and in the face of his social regression.”  Majority opinion at 
20.  Quite naturally, J.H.'s parents were dissatisfied, and the 
school district was well aware of their dissatisfaction.  In 
August of 1987, J.H.’s parents requested that school officials 
place J.H. at Landmark.  Upon the district’s refusal to do so the 
parents unilaterally withdrew J.H. and placed him at Landmark 
themselves. 
 II. 
  The majority's analysis fails to adequately 
consider the totality of these factors which weigh so heavily in 
favor of the parents. Instead, the majority leans with sufficient 
force upon the parents' delay in requesting due process hearings 
to tip the equitable balance in favor of the school district: 
We are cognizant of the fact that the school 
district serves a very large student 
population, and in light of the numerous 
contacts it has with parents seeking the 
individual welfare of their respective 
children, mere notice of parental 
"dissatisfaction" does not alone put the 
Board on reasonable notice that the parents 
will challenge a particular IEP in the future 
and seek reimbursement for an interim 
unilateral placement in a private 
institution. 
 
Majority opinion at 20-21.  J.H.’s situation presents far more 
than “mere notice of parental ‘dissatisfaction.’" This is not a 
case of disgruntled and unrealistic parents who are concerned 
that the school’s curriculum is not sufficiently challenging 
their child.  Furthermore, the size of the student population and 
the number of parental contacts is not pertinent to our inquiry.  
  
An eligible child in a large urban school district is entitled to 
the same free appropriate education as a child in the smallest 
rural community.  The Act does not distinguish based upon the 
size of the student population and we should not allow that 
distinction to influence our analysis.  The school district’s 
size is no excuse for its conduct in this case.  
  The Bernardsville District was clearly on notice, 
albeit not through a formal due process request, that J.H.’s 
parents wanted the school district to pay for the cost of 
Landmark.  The district could have requested hearings in order to 
have the adequacy of its IEP promptly determined and thereby 
prevented the very problem it now complains of, notwithstanding 
the majority’s conclusion that the Act imposes a unilateral 
obligation on the parents. "When a dispute arises between the 
board and the parents, either party has the right to resolve the 
matter through an administrative proceeding known as an 
`impartial due process hearing.'" Lascari, 560 A.2d at 1183 
(citing 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(2)).   
  Courts have routinely held that equity requires 
the burdens of the Act be placed on the school district and not 
on the parents.  See McKenzie v. Smith, 771 F.2d 1527, 1531 (D.C. 
Cir. 1985) (where district sought to change child's IEP, it had 
the burden of proving that the proposed placement complied with 
the requirements of the Act); Grymes v. Madden, 672 F.2d 321, 322 
(3d Cir. 1982) (affirming district court's decision that the 
  
district had "failed to sustain its burden of proof that an 
appropriate public program existed"); Cf. S-1 v. Turlington, 635 
F.2d 342, 348-49 (5th Cir.) (burden on district to question 
whether student's misconduct is due to handicap because parents 
lack expertise to develop an appropriate IEP for their child), 
cert. denied 454 U.S. 1030 (1981), abrogated on other grounds by 
Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305 (1988).  It is understandable that a 
school district may be reluctant to initiate formal proceedings 
against a parent.  However, the district’s failure to do so ought 
to be considered when it asserts that parental delay exonerates 
it from its failure to provide a student with a free appropriate 
public education. 
  Moreover, an argument similar to that accepted by 
the majority was rejected by the Supreme Court in Burlington.  
The town in Burlington argued that the parents had forfeited 
their claimed right to reimbursement for alternative placement by 
removing their child from public school during the pendency of 
administrative proceedings in violation of 20 U.S.C. § 
1415(e)(3).19  The Supreme Court responded by stating: 
We do not agree with the Town that a parental 
violation of § 1415(e)(3) constitutes a 
waiver of reimbursement. The provision says 
nothing about financial responsibility, 
waiver, or parental right to reimbursement at 
the conclusion of judicial proceedings.  
                     
     
19
 Section 1415(e)(3) states in part: "During the pendency 
of any proceedings conducted pursuant to [§ 1415], unless the 
State or local educational agency and the parents . . . otherwise 
agree, the child shall remain in the then current educational 
placement . . . ."  20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(3) (1988).   
  
Moreover, if the provision is interpreted to 
cut off parental rights to reimbursement, the 
principal purpose of the Act will in many 
cases be defeated in the same way as if 
reimbursement were never available. . . . The 
Act was intended to give handicapped children 
both an appropriate education and a free one; 
it should not be interpreted to defeat one or 
the other of those objectives.  
 
Burlington, 471 U.S. at 372.  This case is different because we 
are concerned with parents who withdrew their child prior to 
requesting administrative hearings.  Yet, the situation before us 
is analogous to Burlington and the difference does not allow us 
to abandon the Supreme Court's reasoning. 
 III. 
  We do not achieve “substantial justice” by 
awarding reimbursement for the 1989-90 academic year and 
requiring the parents to pay the remaining two thirds of J.H.’s 
tuition expense.  See majority opinion at 26-27.  These parents 
are seeking reimbursement, not damages.  “Reimbursement merely 
requires the [Bernardsville School District] to belatedly pay 
expenses that it should have paid all along and would have borne 
in the first instance had it developed a proper IEP."  
Burlington, 471 U.S at 370-71.   
  The parents' request for the 1987-88 and 1988-89 
academic years is appropriate and should be granted. Our failure 
to affirm the district court effectively shifts most of the 
obligation of providing an appropriate education from the Board 
  
to the shoulders of J.H.'s parents.  Accordingly, I respectfully 
dissent from Part II A of the majority opinion.  
 
